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Abstract 
We document widespread violations of stochastic dominance in the one-month S&P 500 index 
options market over the period 1986-2002.  These violations imply that a trader can improve her 
expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade.  We allow the market to be incomplete and also 
imperfect by introducing transactions costs and bid-ask spreads.  There is higher incidence of 
violations by OTM than by ITM calls, contradicting the common inference drawn from the observed 
implied volatility smile that the problem lies with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution.  
Even though pre-crash option prices conform to the BSM model reasonably well, they are incorrectly 
priced.  Over 1997-2002, many options, particularly OTM calls, are overpriced irrespective of which 
time period is used to determine the index return distribution.  These results do not support the 
hypothesis that the options market is becoming more rational over time.  Finally, our results dispel 
another common misconception, that the observed smile is too steep after the crash: most of the 
violations by post-crash options are due to the options being either underpriced over 1988-1995, or 
overpriced over 1997-2002. 
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A robust prediction of the celebrated Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) 
(BSM) option pricing model is that the volatility implied by market prices of 
options is constant across strike prices.  Rubinstein (1994) tested this prediction on 
the S&P 500 index options (SPX), traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
an exchange that comes close to the dynamically complete and perfect market 
assumptions underlying the BSM model.  From the start of the exchange-based 
trading in April 1986 until the October 1987 stock market crash, the implied 
volatility is a moderately downward-sloping function of the strike price, a pattern 
referred to as the “volatility smile”, also observed in international markets and to a 
lesser extent on individual-stock options.  Following the crash, the volatility smile is 
typically more pronounced.
1
An equivalent statement of the above prediction of the BSM model, that the 
volatility implied by market prices of options is constant across strike prices, is that 
the risk-neutral stock price distribution is lognormal.  Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), 
Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) and Jackwerth (2000) estimated the risk-neutral 
stock price distribution from the cross section of option prices.
2  Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein (1996) confirmed that, prior to the October 1987 crash, the risk-neutral 
stock price distribution is close to lognormal, consistent with a moderate implied 
volatility smile.  Thereafter, the distribution is systematically skewed to the left, 
consistent with a more pronounced smile. 
These findings raise several important questions.  Does the BSM model work 
well prior to the crash?  If it does, is it because the risk-neutral probability of a 
stock market crash was low and consistent with a lognormal distribution?  Or, is it 
because the risk-neutral probability of a stock market crash was erroneously 
                                                 
1 Brown and Jackwerth (2004), Jackwerth (2004), Shefrin (2005), and Whaley (2003) review the 
literature and potential explanations. 
2 Jackwerth (2004) reviews the parametric and non-parametric methods for estimating the risk-
neutral distribution. 
  1perceived to be low by the market participants?  Why does the BSM model 
typically fail after the crash?  Is it because the risk neutral probability of a stock 
market crash increased after the crash and became inconsistent with a lognormal 
distribution?  Or, is it because the risk neutral probability of a stock market crash 
was erroneously perceived to do so?  Is the options market rational before and after 
the crash? 
Several no-arbitrage models have been proposed and tested that generalize 
the BSM model.  These models explore the effects of generalized stock price 
processes including stock price jumps and stochastic volatility and typically 
generate a volatility smile.  Excellent discussion of these models appears in Hull 
(2005) and McDonald (2003). 
Whereas downward sloping implied volatility is inconsistent with the BSM 
model, it is important to realize that this pattern is not inconsistent with economic 
theory in general.  Two fundamental assumptions of the BSM model are that the 
market is dynamically complete and frictionless.  We empirically investigate 
whether the observed cross sections of one-month S&P 500 index option prices over 
1986-2002 are consistent with various economic models that explicitly allow for a 
dynamically incomplete market and also an imperfect market that recognizes 
trading costs and bid-ask spreads. 
Absence of arbitrage in a frictionless market implies the existence of a 
risk-neutral probability measure, not necessarily unique, such that the price of 
any asset equals the expectation of its payoff under the risk-neutral measure, 
discounted at the risk free rate.  If a risk-neutral measure exists, the ratio of the 
risk-neutral probability density and the real probability density, discounted at 
the risk free rate, is referred to as the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor.  
Thus, absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a strictly positive pricing 
kernel. 
Economic theory imposes restrictions on equilibrium models beyond merely 
the ruling out of arbitrage.  In a frictionless representative-agent economy, the 
pricing kernel equals the representative agent’s intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution over each trading period.  If the representative agent has state 
  2independent (derived) utility of wealth, then the concavity of the utility function 
implies that the pricing kernel is a decreasing function of wealth. 
The monotonicity restriction on the pricing kernel does not critically depend 
on the existence of a representative agent.  If there does not exist at least one 
pricing kernel that is a decreasing function of wealth over each trading period, then 
there does not exist even one economic agent with state independent (derived) 
utility of wealth that is a marginal investor in the market.  Therefore, any economic 
agent can increase her expected utility by trading in these assets.  Hereafter, we 
employ the term stochastic dominance violation to connote the nonexistence of even 
one economic agent with increasing and concave utility that is a marginal investor 
in the market.
3  This means that the return of any agent’s current portfolio is 
stochastically dominated (in the second degree) by the return of another feasible 
portfolio. 
Under the two maintained hypotheses that the marginal investor’s (derived) 
utility of wealth is state independent and wealth is monotone increasing in the 
market index level, the pricing kernel is a decreasing function of the market index 
level.  Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000), and Rosenberg and Engle 
(2002) estimated the pricing kernel implied by the observed cross section of prices 
of S&P 500 index options as a function of wealth, where wealth is proxied by the 
S&P 500 index level.  Jackwerth (2000) reported that the pricing kernel is 
everywhere decreasing during the pre-crash period 1986-1987 but widespread 
violations occur over the post-crash period 1987-1995.  Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) 
reported violations in 1993 and Rosenberg and Engle (2002) reported violations 
over the period 1991-1995.
4  On the other hand, Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) 
estimated plausible values for the risk aversion coefficient of the representative 
agent, albeit under the assumption of power utility, thus restricting the shape of the 
pricing kernel to be monotone decreasing in wealth. 
                                                 
3 This line of research was initiated by Perrakis and Ryan (1984), Levy (1985), and Ritchken 
(1985).  For more recent related contributions, see Perrakis (1986, 1993), Ritchken and Kuo 
(1988), and Ryan (2000, 2003). 
4 Rosenberg and Engle (2002) found violations when they used an orthogonal polynomial pricing 
kernel but not when they used a power pricing kernel. 
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BSM model and the violations of monotonicity of the pricing kernel.  Brown and 
Jackwerth (2004) suggested that the reported violations of the monotonicity of the 
pricing kernel may be an artifact of the maintained hypothesis that the pricing 
kernel is state independent but concluded that volatility cannot be the sole omitted 
state variable in the pricing kernel.  Bollen and Whaley (2004) suggested that 
buying pressure drives the volatility smile while Han (2004) and Shefrin (2005) 
provided behavioral explanations based on sentiment. 
Pan (2002), Garcia, Luger and Renault (2003), and Santa-Clara and Yan 
(2004), among others, obtained plausible parameter estimates in models in which 
the pricing kernel is state dependent, using panel data on S&P 500 options.  Others 
calibrated equilibrium models that generate a volatility smile pattern observed in 
option prices.  Liu, Pan and Wang (2005) investigated rare-event premia driven by 
uncertainty aversion in the context of a calibrated equilibrium model and 
demonstrated that the model generates a volatility smile pattern observed in option 
prices.  Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2005) extended the above 
approach to show that uncertainty aversion is not a necessary ingredient of the 
model.  More significantly, they demonstrated that the model can generate the 
stark regime shift that occurred at the time of the 1987 crash.  While not all of the 
above papers deal explicitly with the monotonicity of the pricing kernel, they do 
address the problem of reconciling the option prices with the historical index record.  
These results are suggestive but stop short of demonstrating absence of stochastic 
dominance violations on a month-by-month basis in the cross section of S&P 500 
options.  This inquiry is the focus of this paper. 
In estimating the statistical distribution of the S&P 500 index returns, we 
refrain from adopting the BSM assumption that the index price is a Brownian 
motion and, therefore, its arithmetic returns are lognormal.  We do not impose a 
parametric form on the distribution of the index returns but proceed in three 
different ways.  In the first approach, we estimate the unconditional distribution as 
the histograms extracted from two different historical index data samples covering 
the periods 1928-1986 and 1972-1986.  In the second approach, we estimate the 
unconditional distribution as the histograms extracted from two different forward-
  4looking samples, one that includes the October 1987 crash (1987-2002) and one that 
excludes it (1988-2002).  Finally, we model the variance of the index returns as a 
GARCH (1,1) process and estimate the conditional variance over the period 1972-
2002 by the semiparametric method of Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991) that does 
not impose the restriction that conditional returns are normally distributed. 
Based on the index return distributions extracted in the above five 
approaches, we test the compliance of option prices to the predictions of models 
that allow for market incompleteness, market imperfections and intermediate 
trading over the life of the options.  Evidence of stochastic dominance violations 
means that any trader can increase her expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-
cost trade.  We consider a market with heterogeneous agents and investigate the 
restrictions on option prices imposed by a particular class of utility-maximizing 
traders that we simply refer to as traders.  We do not make the restrictive 
assumption that all economic agents belong to the class of the utility-maximizing 
traders.  Thus, our results are robust and unaffected by the presence of agents with 
beliefs, endowments, preferences, trading restrictions, and transactions costs 
schedules that differ from those of the utility-maximizing traders modeled in this 
paper. 
Our tests accommodate at least three implications associated with state 
dependence.  First, each month we search for a pricing kernel to price the cross 
section of one-month options without imposing restrictions on the time series 
properties of the pricing kernel month by month.  Thus we allow the pricing kernel 
to be state dependent.  Second, in the second part of our investigation, we allow for 
intermediate trading; a trader’s wealth on the expiration date of the options is 
generally a function not only of the price of the market index on that date but also 
of the entire path of the index level, thereby rendering the pricing kernel state 
dependent.  Third, we allow the variance of the index return to be state dependent 
and employ the forecasted conditional variance. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a model for 
pricing options and state restrictions on the prices of options imposed by the 
absence of stochastic dominance violations.  One form of these restrictions is a set 
of linear inequalities on the pricing kernel that can be tested by testing the 
  5feasibility of a linear program.  The second form of these restrictions is an upper 
and lower bound on the prices of options.  In Section 3, we test the compliance of 
bid and ask one-month index options to these restrictions and discuss the results.  
In the concluding Section 4, we summarize the empirical findings and suggest 
directions for future research. 
 
2  Restrictions on Option Prices Imposed 
by Stochastic Dominance 
 
2.1 The  Market 
 
We consider a market with heterogeneous agents and investigate the restrictions on 
option prices imposed by a particular class of utility-maximizing traders that we 
simply refer to as traders.  We do not make the restrictive assumption that all 
agents belong to the class of the utility-maximizing traders.  Thus our results are 
unaffected by the presence of agents with beliefs, endowments, preferences, trading 
restrictions, and transactions cost schedules that differ from those of the utility-
maximizing traders. 
Trading occurs at a finite number of trading dates.  The utility-maximizing 
traders are allowed to hold only two primary securities in the market, a bond and a 
stock.  The stock has the natural interpretation as the market index.  The bond is 
risk free and pays constant interest each period.  The traders may buy and sell the 
bond without incurring transactions costs.  We assume that the rate of return on 
the stock is identically and independently distributed over time. 
Stock trades incur proportional transactions costs charged to the bond 
account.  There is no presumption that all agents in the economy face the same 
schedule of transactions costs as the traders do.  At each date, a trader chooses the 
investment in the bond and stock accounts to maximize the expected utility of net 
  6worth at the terminal date.  We make the plausible assumption that the utility 
function is increasing and concave.  Note that even this weak assumption of 
monotonicity and concavity of preferences is not imposed on all agents in the 
economy but only on the subset of agents that we refer to as traders. 
In Appendix A, we formulate this problem as a dynamic program.  As 
shown in Constantinides (1979), the value function is monotone increasing and 
concave in the dollar values in the bond and stock accounts, properties that it 
inherits from the monotonicity and concavity of the utility function.  This implies 
that, at any date, the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account is strictly 
positive and decreasing in the dollar value in the bond account; and the marginal 
utility of wealth out of the stock account is strictly positive and decreasing in the 
dollar value in the stock account.  We search for marginal utilities with the above 
properties that support the prices of the bond, stock and derivatives at a given 
point in time. 
If we fail to find such a set marginal utilities, then any trader with increasing 
and concave utility can increase her expected utility by trading in the options, the 
index and the risk free rate—hence equilibrium does not exist.  These strategies are 
termed stochastically dominant for the purposes of this paper, insofar as they would 
be adopted by all traders with utility possessing the required properties, in the same 
way that all risk averse investors would choose a dominant portfolio over a 
dominated one in conventional second degree stochastic dominance comparisons. 
We emphasize that the restriction on option prices imposed by the criterion 
of the absence of stochastic dominance is motivated by the economically plausible 
assumption that there exists at least one agent in the economy with the properties 
that we assign to a trader.  This is a substantially weaker assumption than 
requiring that all agents to have the properties that we assign to traders.   
Stochastic dominance then implies that at least one agent, but not necessarily all 
agents, increases her expected utility by trading.
5  In our empirical investigation, we 
                                                 
5 We also emphasize that the restriction of the absence of stochastic dominance is weaker than 
the restriction that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) holds.  The CAPM requires that the 
pricing kernel be linearly decreasing in the index price.  The absence of stochastic dominance 
merely imposes that the pricing kernel be monotone decreasing in the index price. 
  7report the percentage of months for which the problem is feasible.  These are 
months for which stochastic dominance violations are ruled out. 
 
2.2  Restrictions in the Single-Period Model 
 
The single-period model does not rule out trading over the trader’s horizon after the 
options expire; it just rules out trading over the one-month life of the options.  In 
Section 2.3, we consider the more realistic case in which traders are allowed to 
trade the bond and stock at one intermediate date over the life of the options. 
The stock market index has price   at the beginning of the period; ex 
dividend price   with probability 
0 S
1i S πi in state  = , 1,..., ii I at the end of the period; 
and cum dividend price ( ) δ + 1 1 i S  at the end of the period.  We order the states 
such that   is increasing in i.  1i S
We define   as the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account 




S M  as the marginal utility of wealth out of the 
stock account at the beginning of the period;  ( ) 1
B
i M  as the marginal utility of 
wealth out of the bond account at the end of the period; and  ( ) 1
S
i M  as the 
marginal utility of wealth out of the stock account at the end of the period.
6  The 
marginal utility of wealth out of the bond and stock accounts at the beginning of 
the period is strictly positive: 
 
( ) 0
B M > 0       ( 2 . 1 )  
and 
( ) 0
S M > 0
                                                
.       ( 2 . 2 )  
 




6 The marginal utilities are formally defined in Appendix B. 
7 Since the value of the bond account at the end of the period is independent of the state i, we 
cannot impose the condition that the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account is 
decreasing in the dollar value of the bond account. 
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() 10 , 1 , . . . ,
B
i Mi >= I .     (2.3) 
 
Historically, the sample mean of the premium of the market return over the 
risk free rate is positive.  Under the assumption of positive expected premium, the 
trader is long in the stock.  Since the assumption in the single-period model is that 
there is no trading between the bond and stock accounts over the life of the option, 
the trader’s dollar value in the stock account at the end of the period is increasing 
in the stock return.  Note that this conclusion critically depends on the assumption 
that there is no intermediate trading in the bond and stock.  Since we employed the 
convention that the stock return is increasing in the state i, the dollar value in the 
stock account at the end of the period is increasing in the state i.  Then the 
condition that the marginal utility of wealth out of the stock account at the end of 
the period is strictly positive and decreasing in the dollar value in the stock account 
is stated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 12 1 1 ... 1 0
SS S
I MM M ≥≥ > .     (2.4) 
 
On each date, the trader may transfer funds between the bond and stock 
accounts and incur transactions costs.  Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution 
between the bond and stock accounts differs from unity by, at most, the 
transactions cost rate: 
 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + 10 0 1
BS B kM M kM 0    (2.5) 
and 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + = 1 1 1 1 1 , 1,...,
BS B
ii i kM M kM i I . (2.6) 
 
Marginal analysis on the bond holdings leads to the following condition on 
the marginal rate of substitution between the bond holdings at beginning and end 
of the period: 
 










B .     (2.7) 
 
Marginal analysis on the stock holdings leads to the following condition on the 
marginal rate of substitution between the stock holdings at the beginning of the 




















⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ .   (2.8) 
 
We consider J European call and put options on the index, with random 
cash payoff   at the end of the period in state i.  At the beginning of the period, 
the trader can buy the 
ij X
th j  derivative at price  j j Pk +  and sell it at price  j j Pk − , 
net of transactions costs.  Thus 2 j k  is the bid-ask spread plus the round-trip 
transactions cost that the trader incurs in trading the 
th j  derivative.  Note that 
there is no presumption that all agents in the economy face the same bid-ask 
spreads and transactions costs as the traders do. 
We assume that the traders are marginal in all the J  derivatives.  
Furthermore, we assume that a trader has sufficiently small positions in the 
derivatives relative to her holdings in the bond and stock that the monotonicity and 
concavity conditions on the value function remain valid.  Marginal analysis leads to 
the following restrictions on the prices of options: 
 
() () () () ()
1
0 1 0 , 1,...,
I
BB B
jj i i i j jj
i
Pk M M X Pk M j J π
=
−≤ ≤ += ∑ . (2.9) 
 
Conditions (2.1)-(2.9) define a linear program.  In our empirical analysis, 
each month we check for feasibility of conditions (2.1)-(2.9) by using the linear 
programming features of the optimization toolbox of MATLAB 7.0.  We report the 
percentage of months in which the linear program is feasible and, therefore, 
stochastic dominance is ruled out. 
  10A useful way to identify the options that cause infeasibility or near-
infeasibility of the problem is to single out a “test” option, say the   option, and 

















= ∑ i n ,     (2.10) 
 
subject to conditions (2.1)-(2.9).  If this problem is feasible, then the attained 
maximum and minimum have the following interpretation.  If one can buy the test 
option for less than the minimum attained in this problem, then at least one 
investor, but not necessarily all investors, increases her expected utility by trading 
the test option.  Likewise, if one can write the test option, for more than the 
maximum attained in this problem, then again at least one investor increases her 
expected utility by trading the test option. 
 
2.3  Restrictions in the Two-Period Model 
 
We relax the assumption of the single-period model that, over the one-month life of 
the options, markets for trading are open only at the beginning and end of the 
period; we allow for a third trading date in the middle of the month.  We define the 
marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account and out of the stock account at 
each one of the three trading dates and set up the linear program as a direct 
extension of the program (2.1)-(2.9) in Section 2.2.  The explicit program is given in 
Appendix B.  In our empirical analysis, we report the percentage of months in 
which the linear program is feasible and, therefore, stochastic dominance is ruled 
out. 
In principle, we may allow for more than one intermediate trading date over 
the one-month life of the options.  However, the numerical implementation becomes 
tedious as both the number of constraints and variables in the linear program 
increase exponentially in the number of intermediate trading dates.  This 
consideration motivates the development of bounds that are independent of the 
  11allowed frequency of trading of the stock and bond over the life of the option.   
These bounds are presented below. 
 
2.4  The Constantinides-Perrakis Option Bounds 
 
Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) recognized that it is possible to recursively 
apply the single-period approach and derive stochastic dominance bounds on option 
prices in a market with intermediate trading over the life of the options.
8  The 
significance of these bounds is that they are invariant to the allowed frequency of 
trading the bond and stock over the life of the options. 
The task of computing these bounds is easy compared to the full-fledged 
investigation of the feasibility of conditions for large T  for two reasons.  First, the 
derivation of the bounds takes advantage of the special structure of the payoff of a 
call or put option, specifically the convexity of the payoff as a function of the stock 
price.  Second, the set of assets is limited to three assets: the bond, stock and one 
option, the test option. 
The upper and lower bounds on a test option have the following 
interpretation.  If one can buy the test option for less than the lower option bound, 
then there is stochastic dominance violation between the bond, stock and the test 
option.  Likewise, if one can write the test option for more than the upper option 
bound, then again there is stochastic dominance violation between the bond, stock 
and the test option.  Below, we state these bounds without proof.
9
                                                 
8 Constantinides and Zariphopoulou (1999, 2001) and Constantinides and Perrakis (2002, 2004) 
derived bounds on option prices in the presence of transactions costs.  For alternative ways to 
price options with transactions costs, see Leland (1985) and Bensaid et al (1992). 
9 These bounds may not be the tightest possible bounds for any given frequency of trading.   
However, they are presented here because of their universality in that they do not depend on the 
frequency of trading over the life of the option.  For a comprehensive discussion and derivation of 
these and other possibly tighter bounds that are specific to the allowed frequency of trading, see 
Constantinides and Perrakis (2002).  See also Constantinides and Perrakis (2004) for extensions 
to American-style options and futures options. 
  12At any time t prior to expiration, the following is an upper bound on the 
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,    (2.11) 
 
where  S R  is the expected return on the stock per unit time. 
A partition-independent lower bound for a call option can also be found, but 
only if it is additionally assumed that there exists at least one trader for whom the 
investment horizon coincides with the option expiration,  ' TT = .  In such a case, 
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where   is one plus the risk free rate per unit time.  R
Put option upper and lower bounds also exist that are independent of the 
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The call upper bound (2.11) provides a tighter upper bound on the implied 
volatility than the put upper bound (2.13).  The call lower bound (2.12) and the 
put lower bound (2.14) provide similar lower bounds on the implied volatility.  In 
figures 1-4, we present the upper bound on the implied volatility based on equation 
                                                 
10 In the special case of zero transactions costs, the assumption  ' TT =  is redundant because the 
put-call parity holds. 
  13(2.11) and the lower bound based on equation (2.12).  We discuss the violation of 
these bounds in Section 3.6. 
 
3  Empirical Results 
 
3.1  Data 
 
We use the historical daily record of the S&P 500 index and its daily dividend 
record over the period 1928-2002.  The monthly index return is based on 30 
calendar day (21 trading day) returns.  In order to avoid difficulties with the 
estimated historical mean of the returns, we demean all our samples and 
reintroduce a mean 4% annualized premium o v e r  t h e  r i s k  f r e e  r a t e .   T h e  
unconditional distribution of the index is extracted from four alternative samples of 
thirty-day index returns: the historical samples use returns either over the period 
1928-1986 or over the period 1972-1986; the forward-looking sample inclusive of the 
crash  uses the returns over the period 1987-2002 and includes the 1987 stock 
market crash; the forward-looking sample exclusive of the crash uses the returns 
over the period 1988-2002 and excludes the stock market crash.  Finally, we 
estimate the conditional distribution over the period 1972-2002 by the 
semiparametric GARCH (1,1) model of Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991), a model 
that does not impose the restriction that conditional returns are normally 
distributed, as explained in Appendix D.
11
                                                 
11 The index return sample and the option price sample do not align.  We use the conditional 
volatility of the 30-day return period which starts before the option sample and covers it partly at 
the beginning.  We recalculated the results by using the conditional volatility of the 30-day return 
period which starts during the option sample and covers it partly at the end and then continues 
beyond the option sample.  The two sets of results are practically indistinguishable and thus, we 
do not report the latter results here. 
  14For the S&P 500 index options we use two data sources.  For the period 
1986-1995, we use the tick-by-tick Berkeley Options Database of all quotes and 
trades.  We focus on the most liquid call options with K/S ratio (moneyness) in the 
range 0.90-1.05.  For 108 months we retain only the call option quotes for the day 
corresponding to options thirty days to expiration.
12  For each day retained in the 
sample, we aggregate the quotes to the minute and pick the minute between 9:00-
11:00 AM with the most quotes as our cross section for the month.  We present 
these quotes in terms of their bid and ask implied volatilities.  These are the 
volatilities which would be needed in the BSM formula to price the option 
exactly at the bid or ask quote, respectively.  Details on this database are 
provided in Appendix C, Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), and Jackwerth 
(2000). 
For the period 1997-2002, we obtain call and put option prices from the 
Option Metrics Database, described in Appendix C.  Note that we do not have 
options data for 1996 from either data source.  Only options with at least 100 
traded contracts are included.  We calculate a hypothetical noon option cross 
section from the closing cross section and the index observed at noon and the close.  
Here we assume that the implied volatilities do not change between noon and the 
close.  We start out with 69 raw cross sections and are left with 68 final cross 
sections. The time to expiration is 29 days. 
Since the Berkeley Options Database provides much cleaner data than the 
Option Metrics Database, we expect a higher incidence of stochastic dominance 
violations over the 1997-2002 period than over the 1986-1995 period due to data 
problems.  Thus we are cautious in comparing results across these two periods. 
 
                                                 
12 We lose some months for which we do not have sufficient data, i.e., months with less than five 
different strike prices, months after the crash of October 1987 until June 1988, and months before 
the introduction of S&P 500 index options in April 1986. 
  153.2  Assumptions on Bid-Ask Spreads and Trading Fees 
 
There is no presumption that all agents in the economy face the same bid-ask 
spreads and transactions costs as the traders do.  We assume that the traders are 
subject to the following bid-ask spreads and trading fees.  For the index, we model 
the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee as a one-way 
proportional transactions cost rate equal to 50 bps of the index price. 
For the call options obtained from the Berkeley Options Database over the 
period 1986-1995, we proceed as follows.  For the at-the-money call, we set the 
combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee equal to 20 (or 5, or 50) 
bps of the index price.  This corresponds to about 75 (or 19, or 188) cents one-way 
fee per call.  For any other call, the fee is proportional to the call price.   
Specifically, the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee is equal 
to the fee on the at-the-money call multiplied by the ratio of the price of the said 
call and the price of the at-the-money call.  Only in Table 3 do we present results 
under the assumption that the fee is fixed: the combined one-half bid-ask spread 
and one-way trading fee is equal to the fee on the at-the-money call. 
For the call and put options obtained from the Option Metrics Database 
over the period 1997-2002, we proceed as follows.  For the at-the-money call, we set 
the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee equal to 20 (or 5, or 
50) bps of the index price.  For any other option (call or put), the fee is 
proportional to the option price. 
 
3.3  Stochastic Dominance Violations in the Single-Period 
Case 
 
Each month we check for feasibility of conditions (2.1)-(2.9).  Infeasibility of these 
conditions implies stochastic dominance: any trader can improve her utility by 
trading in these assets without incurring any out-of-pocket costs.  If we rule out 
bid-ask spreads and trading fees, we find that these conditions are violated in all 
months. 
  16We introduce bid-ask spreads and trading fees as described in Section 3.2.  
The one-way transactions cost rate (one-way trading fee plus half the bid-ask 
spread) on the index is 50 bps.  For the at-the-money call, the one-way transactions 
cost rate is 20 bps of the index price, or about 75 cents.  For any other option, the 
fee is proportional to the option price, as described in Section 3.2.  The number of 
calls in each (filtered) monthly cross section fluctuates between 5 and 23 with 
median 10.  The percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations is 
displayed in Table 1.  The bracketed numbers in the first row are bootstrap 
standard deviations of the first-row entries, based on 1,000 samples of the 1928-2002 
historical returns.  The standard deviations are high and, therefore, comparisons of 
the table entries across the rows and columns should be made with caution.  In the 
second and third rows in each cell, we display the non-violations in the cases where 





The time series of option prices is divided into six periods and stochastic 
dominance violations in each period are reported in different columns, labeled as 
panels A-F.  The first period extends from May 1986 to October 16, 1987, just prior 
to the crash.  The other five periods are all post-crash and span July 1988 to March 
1991, April 1991 to August 1993, September 1993 to December 1995, February 1997 
to December 1999 and February 2000 to December 2002.  Note that we do not have 
options data for 1996 from either data source. 
The time series of index returns is divided into five samples and stochastic 
dominance violations are reported in different rows for each sample.  The first 
sample covers 1928-1986 and excludes the crash.  Since there are too many 
observations, only every 6
th return is recorded in building the empirical 
unconditional return distribution.  The second sample covers 1972-1986 and again 
excludes the crash.  It is shorter than the first sample to control for the 
possibility of a regime shift in the return distribution.  The third sample covers 
1987-2002, including the crash.  The fourth sample covers 1988-2002, excluding 
  17the crash.  The last row in the table displays the feasibility in the index sample 
1972-2002, where the one-month index return distribution is conditional on 
volatility and is estimated as in Appendix D.  In all five samples, the mean 
premium of the index return over the risk free return is adjusted to be 4% 
annually.
13
Most table entries are well below 100%, indicating that there are a number 
of months in which the risk free rate, the price of the index, and the prices of the 
cross section of calls are inconsistent with a market in which there is even one 
risk-averse trader who is marginal in these securities, net of generous transactions 
costs. 
The top left entry of 73% refers to the index return distribution over the 
period 1928-1986 and option prices over the pre-crash period from May 1986 to 
October 16, 1987.  In 27% of these months, conditions (2.1)-(2.9) are infeasible 
and the prices imply stochastic dominance violations despite the generous 
allowance for transactions costs.  The next three entries to the right, panels B-D, 
refer to call prices over the first three post-crash periods.  There are fewer 
violations in the first three post-crash periods than in the pre-crash period. 
Violations dramatically increase in the last two post-crash periods, panels 
E-F.  However, these results should be interpreted with caution.  Recall that the 
quality of the option data in the 1997-2002 period is inferior to the quality in the 
1986-1995 period.  However, the quality of data in the 1997-1999 and 2000-2002 
periods is the same and comparisons are meaningful.  There are more violations 
in the 2000-2002 period than in the 1997-1999 period.  The later finding is 
reversed in the last row where we employ the conditional index return 
distribution. 
We investigate the robustness of the historical estimate of the index return 
distribution over the period 1928-1986 by re-estimating the historical distribution 
of the index return over the more recent period 1972-1986.  The results are 
                                                 
13 We make t his adjustme nt in order t o esche w the issues of the predictability of the equity 
premium and its estimation from historical samples.  Our results remain practically unchanged if 
we do not make this adjustment.  Essentially, the prices of one-month options are insensitive to 
the expected return on the stock. 
  18displayed in the second row of Table 1.  The results in panels A-D remain largely 
unchanged.  However the incidence of violations substantially increases in the 
period 1997-2002. 
When we use the forward-looking index sample 1987-2002 that includes 
the crash (third row) or the forward-looking index sample 1988-2002 that 
excludes it (fourth row), the pre-crash options exhibit more violations (panel A).  
Also, when we use the conditional index return distribution, the incidence of 
violations is higher than when we use the historical index samples and 
comparable to the incidence of violations when we use the forward-looking index 
sample. 
Our interpretation is that, before the crash, option traders were 
unsophisticated and were extensively using the BSM pricing model.  Recall the 
stylized observation that, from the start of the exchange-based trading until the 
October 1987 stock market crash, the implied volatility is a moderately 
downward-sloping function of the strike price; following the crash, the volatility 
smile is typically more pronounced.  This means that the BSM model typically 
fits the data better before the crash than after it, once the constant volatility 
input is judiciously chosen as an input to the BSM formula.  This does not imply 
that investors were more rational before the crash than after it.  In fact, our 
results in panels A-D suggest that options were priced more rationally after the 
crash than before it.  The results contrast with the evidence in Jackwerth (2000), 
that the estimated pricing kernel is monotonically decreasing (corresponding to 
few, if any, violations) in the pre-crash period, but locally increasing 
(corresponding to several violations) during the post-crash period.
14
Looking across rows, we observe that the pre-crash call prices are more 
consistent with the historical index distribution (1928-2002 and 1972-2002) than 
the post-crash distribution (with or without the crash event, conditional or 
unconditional).  This result accords with intuition.  The post-crash option prices 
in 1988-1995 (panels B-D) generally have few violations.  However, violations by 
                                                 
14 The pattern in Jackwerth (2000) does not match with Table 1 for two reasons.  First, he 
applies a different technique, estimating separately the smoothed risk-neutral and actual 
distributions and then taking their ratio.  Second, his option price sample ends in 1995. 
  19option prices in 1997-2002 (panels E-F) send a mixed message.  The violations 
are lowest when using either the longer historical index sample 1972-1986 or the 
conditional index return distribution. 
 
3.4  Robustness in the Single-Period Case 
 
Floor traders, institutional investors and broker-assisted investors face different 
transactions cost schedules in trading options.  Are the results robust under 
different transactions cost schedules?  In Table 1, the number in the second row 
of each cell is the percentage of non-violations when the combined one-half bid-
ask spread and one-way trading fee on one option is based on 5 bps of the index 
price.  We observe a large percentage of violations for all index and option price 
periods.  Consistent with the earlier observation, there are fewer violations in the 
first three post-crash periods than in the pre-crash period.  The number in the 
third row of each cell is the percentage of non-violations when the combined one-
half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee on one option is based on 50 bps of 
the index price.  Predictably, we observe fewer violations for all index and option 




Is the pattern of violation similar across the in-the-money and out-of-the-
money options?  Table 2 displays the percentage of months in which stochastic 
dominance is absent in the cross section of in-the-money calls (top entry) and 
out-of-the-money calls (bottom entry).  In all cases, there is a higher percentage 
of violations by OTM calls than by ITM calls, suggesting that the mispricing is 
caused by the right-hand tail of the index return distribution and not by the left-
hand tail.
15  Another way to see this is by comparing the first rows in Table 1 
                                                 
15 This inference is subject to the criticism that it may be an artifact of sample size.  The sample 
of OTM calls is larger than the sample of ITM calls.  Other things equal, the larger the sample, 
the harder it is to find a monotone decreasing pricing kernel that prices the calls. 
  20with the Table 2 OTM results: addition of the ITM calls does not decrease the 
feasibility.  This observation is novel and contradicts the common inference 
drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the problem lies with the 
left-hand tail of the index return distribution.  We revisit these violation patterns 




Table 3 displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance 
violations are absent in the cross section of option prices but now with fixed 
instead of proportional transactions costs.  The one-way transactions costs rate 
(one-way trading fee plus half the bid-ask spread) on the index is 50 bps.  The 
one-way transactions costs on each option is 20 bps of the index price.  The 
pattern of violations is similar to the pattern displayed in Table 1 with variable 
transactions costs.  With the exception of panel D, there are generally fewer 
violations when the transactions costs are fixed.  Recall from Table 2 that OTM 
calls are responsible for more violations than ITM calls.  Fixed transactions costs 
imply larger transactions costs for the troublesome OTM calls, provide greater 
leeway for the prices of these calls and, therefore, decrease the number of 
violations. 
 
3.5  Stochastic Dominance Violations in the Two-Period 
Model 
 
In the previous section, we considered feasibility in the context of the single-period 
model.  We established that there are stochastic dominance violations in a 
significant percentage of the months.  Does the percentage of stochastic dominance 
violations increase or decrease as the allowed frequency of trading in the stock and 
bond over the life of the option increases?  In the special case of zero transactions 
costs, i.i.d. returns and constant relative risk aversion, it can be theoretically shown 
that the percentage of violations should increase as the allowed frequency of trading 
  21increases.  However, we cannot provide a theoretical answer if we relax any of the 
above three assumptions.  Therefore, we address the question empirically. 
We compare the percentage of stochastic dominance violations in two 
models, one with one intermediate trading date over the life of the options and 
another with no intermediate trading dates over the life of the options.  To this 
end, we partition the 30-day horizon into two 15-day intervals and approximate the 
15-day return distribution by a 21-point kernel density estimate of the 15-day 
returns.  We use the standard Gaussian kernel of Silverman (1986, pp. 15, 43, and 
45).  The assumed transactions costs are as in the base case presented in Table 1.  
The one-way transactions costs rate (one-way trading fee plus half the bid-ask 
spread) on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transactions cost on the at-the-money 
call is 20 bps of the index price.  For any other call, the fee is proportional to the 




We may not investigate the effect of intermediate trading by directly 
comparing the results in Tables 1 and 4 because the return generating process 
differs in the two tables.  Recall that the results in Table 1 are based on a 30-day 
stock return generating process that has as many different returns as the different 
observed realizations and frequency equal to the observed frequency.
16  By contrast, 
the results in Table 4 are based on a simplified 15-day 21-point kernel density 
estimate of the 15-day returns.  The coarseness of the grid is dictated by the need 
to keep the problem computationally manageable.  The 30-day return then is the 
product of two 15-day returns treated as i.i.d.  With this process of the 30-day 
return, we calculate the percentage of months without stochastic dominance 
violations and report the results in Table 4 in brackets. 
The effect of allowing for one intermediate trading date over the life of the 
one-month options is shown by the top entries in Table 4.  These entries are 
contrasted with the bracketed entries which represent the percentage of months 
                                                 
16 For the long historical sample of stock returns, we take only every sixth monthly return. 
  22without stochastic dominance violations when intermediate trading is forbidden.   
The comparison shows that intermediate trading has an ambiguous effect on 
stochastic dominance violations in the option samples, that depends to a large 
extent on the distribution used to calculate the index returns.  For the long 
historical sample intermediate trading slightly decreases the frequency of violations 
in all panels, while it increases it, sometimes dramatically so, for the shorter 
historical sample.  The increase in the frequency of violations also predominates, 
but not always consistently, for the remaining three samples.  We conclude that 
intermediate trading does not weaken, and possibly strengthens, the single-period 
systematic evidence of stochastic dominance violations.  In the next section, we 
obtain further insights on the causes of infeasibility, by displaying the options that 
violate the upper and lower bounds on option prices. 
 
3.6  Stochastic Dominance Bounds in the Single-Period and 
Multiperiod Cases 
 
In Section 2.4, equations (2.11)-(2.14), we stated a set of stochastic dominance 
bounds on option prices that apply irrespective of the permitted frequency of 
trading in the bond and stock accounts over the life of the option.  We calculate 
these bounds and translate them as bounds on the implied volatility of option 
prices.  In figures 1-4, we present the upper implied volatility bound based on (2.11) 
and the lower bound based on (2.12).  The bid-ask spread on the option price is 
taken into consideration, as we present both the bid and ask option prices, 
translated into implied volatilities.  A violation occurs whenever an observed option 
bid price lies above the upper bound or an observed option ask price lies below the 
lower bound.  The upper and lower option bounds are based on the index return 
distribution derived from the historical index samples 1928-1986 (figure 1) and 
1972-1986 (figure 2), and the forward looking samples 1987-2002 (figure 3) and 
1988-2002 (figure 4).  In each figure, the six panels correspond to option prices 
(implied volatilities) over the pre-crash period (panel A) and the five post-crash 





The downward-sloping shape of the bounds is similar across figures 1-4.   
However, the upper and lower bounds in figure 1 are higher than the bounds in 
figures 2-4 because the index volatility over 1928-1986 is 40% higher than the index 
volatility over the index periods corresponding to figures 2-4.  The pattern of 
violations follows quite naturally.  The flat pre-crash smile fits reasonably well 
within the bounds based on the index return over 1928-1986 even though these are 
downward sloping.  The post-crash smiles over 1988-1995 (panels B-D) are too low 
for the rather high location of these bounds. 
The bounds based on the index return over the historical 1972-1986 and 
forward-looking samples (figures 2-4) are located somewhat lower than the 
historical 1928-1986 sample bounds.  Therefore, they match the also downward-
sloping post-crash option prices in panels B-D rather well because they are located 
somewhat lower too.  However, they do not match very well the higher horizontal 
smile of the pre-crash options. 
Several option prices over the periods 1997-1999 and 2000-2002 (panels E-F) 
are way above the bounds in all the figures, irrespective of whether the bounds were 
calculated from historical or forward-looking index returns.  This is an altogether 
different pattern of violations than in the earlier panels A-D.  In interpreting the 
high incidence of violations of option prices over the period 1997-2002 in Tables 1-4, 
we were conservative because of concerns regarding the quality of the Option 
Metrics Database.  The figures provide a clearer picture.  If the violations were the 
result of low quality of the data, then we would observe roughly as many violations 
of the lower bound as we do of the upper bound.  This is not the case.  Most of the 
violations are violations of the upper bound.  Simply put, over 1997-2002, many 
options, particularly OTM calls, were overpriced relative to the theoretical bounds, 
irrespective of which time period is used to determine the index return distribution.  
These results do not support the hypothesis that the options market is becoming 
  24more rational over time, particularly after the crash.  The decrease in violations 
over the post-crash period 1988-1995 (panels B-D) is followed by a substantial 
increase in violations over 1997-2002 (panels E-F). 
Across all figures, we observe that both upper and lower bounds exhibit a 
clear smile pattern.  Thus the theory states that option prices should exhibit a 
smile both before and after the crash.  The observed pre-crash option prices (panel 
A) approximately conform to the BSM model with a horizontal smile.  By contrast, 
the post-crash observed option prices (panels B-D) progressively show more marked 
departures from horizontality, which still lie within the bounds in panel B but 
violate strongly the bounds in panels C and D, even around at-the-money.  This 
conforms closely to the observation originally made by Rubinstein (1994) that 
option prices behave differently before and after the crash, with the former 
following the BSM model and the latter not.  Over the period 1997-2002 (panels E-
F), option prices exhibit a mild smile.  However, their predominant feature is that 
they are overpriced, particularly the OTM calls. 
In all figures, panel A, several pre-crash ask prices of OTM calls in panel A 
fall below the lower bound.  Even though pre-crash option prices follow the BSM 
model reasonably well, it does not follow that these options are correctly priced.  
Our novel finding is that pre-crash option prices are incorrectly priced, if the 
distribution of the index return is based on the historical experience.  Furthermore, 
some of these prices are below the bounds, contrary to received wisdom that 
historical volatility generally underprices options in the BSM model. 
All figures dispel another common misconception, that the observed smile is 
too steep after the crash.  Our novel finding is that most of the bound violations by 
post-crash options are due to the options being either underpriced (over 1988-1995, 
panels B-D) or overpriced (over 1997-2002, panels E-F). 
 
  254  Concluding Remarks 
 
We document widespread violations of stochastic dominance in the one-month S&P 
500 index options market over the period 1986-2002, before and after the October 
1987 stock market crash.  We do not impose a parametric model on the index 
return distribution but estimate it as the histogram of the sample distribution, 
using five different index return samples: long and short samples before the crash; 
two forward-looking samples, one that includes the crash and one that excludes it; 
and a sample with forecasted conditional volatility.  We allow the market to be 
incomplete and also be imperfect by introducing generous transactions costs in 
trading the index and options. 
Evidence of stochastic dominance violations means that any trader can 
increase her expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade.  We consider a 
market with heterogeneous agents and investigate the restrictions on option prices 
imposed by a particular class of utility-maximizing traders that we simply refer to 
as traders.  We do not make the restrictive assumption that all economic agents 
belong to the class of the utility-maximizing traders.  Thus our results are robust 
and unaffected by the presence of agents with beliefs, endowments, preferences, 
trading restrictions, and transactions cost schedules that differ from those of the 
utility-maximizing traders modeled in this paper. 
Our empirical design allows for three implications associated with state 
dependence.  First, each month we search for a pricing kernel to price the cross 
section of one-month options without imposing restrictions on the time series 
properties of the pricing kernel month by month.  Thus we allow the pricing kernel 
to be state dependent.  Second, we allow for intermediate trading; a trader’s wealth 
on the expiration date of the options is generally a function not only of the price of 
the market index on that date but also of the entire path of the index level thereby 
rendering the pricing kernel state dependent.  Third, we allow the variance of the 
index return to be state dependent and employ the estimated conditional variance. 
  26The pre-crash call prices are more consistent with the historical index 
distribution than the post-crash distribution.  This result accords with intuition.  
The post-crash option prices in 1988-1995 generally have few violations.  However, 
violations by option prices in 1997-2002 send a mixed message.  The violations are 
lowest when using either the longer historical index sample 1972-1986 or the 
conditional index return distribution.  Thus, there is no systematic evidence that 
investors are more rational after the crash than before it. 
In all cases, there is a higher percentage of violations by OTM calls than by 
ITM calls, suggesting that the right-hand tail of the index return distribution is at 
least as problematic as the left-hand tail.  This observation is novel and contradicts 
the common inference drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the 
problem lies with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution. 
Over 1997-2002, many options, particularly OTM calls, are overpriced 
relative to the theoretical bounds, irrespective of which time period is used to 
determine the index return distribution.  One possible explanation is the poor 
quality of the data over this period compared to the data over the 1986-1995 
period.  In any case, these results do not support the hypothesis that the options 
market is becoming more rational over time. 
Even though pre-crash option prices conform to the BSM model reasonably 
well, it does not follow that these options are correctly priced.  Our novel finding is 
that pre-crash options are incorrectly priced, if the distribution of the index return 
is based on the historical experience.  Our interpretation of these results is that, 
before the crash, option traders were extensively using the BSM pricing model.   
Recall the stylized observation that, from the start of the exchange-based trading 
until the October 1987 stock market crash, the implied volatility is a moderately 
downward-sloping function of the strike price; following the crash, the volatility 
smile is typically more pronounced.  This means that the BSM model typically fits 
the data better before the crash than after it, once the constant volatility input is 
judiciously chosen as an input to the BSM formula.  However, the fit of the BSM 
model or lack of it does not speak on the rationality of option prices. 
Our results dispel another common misconception, that the observed smile is 
too steep after the crash.  Our novel finding is that most of the bound violations by 
  27post-crash options are due to the options being either underpriced over 1988-1995, 
or overpriced over 1997-2002. 
Finally, in many of the violations, option prices are below the bounds, 
contrary to received wisdom that historical volatility generally underprices options 
in the BSM model. 
By providing an integrated approach to the pricing of options that allows for 
incomplete and imperfect markets, we provide testable restrictions on option prices 
that include the BSM model as a special case.  We reviewed the empirical evidence 
on the prices of S&P 500 index options.  The economic restrictions are violated 
surprisingly often, suggesting that the mispricing of these options cannot be entirely 
attributed to the fact that the BSM model does not allow for market 
incompleteness and realistic transaction costs.  Whereas we allowed for a number of 
implications associated with state variables, it remains an open and challenging 
topic for future research to investigate whether state variables, possibly omitted in 
our investigation, explain the reported month-by-month violations of stochastic 
dominance. 
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Trading occurs at a finite number  of trading dates,  = 0,1,..., ,..., ' tT T .
17  T h e  
utility-maximizing traders are allowed to hold only two primary securities in the 
market, a bond and a stock.  The bond is risk free and pays constant interest  1 R −  
each period.  The traders may buy and sell the bond without incurring transactions 
costs.  At date t, the cum dividend stock price is ( ) δ + 1 tt S , the cash dividend is 
δtt S , and the ex dividend stock price is  , where  t S t δ  is the dividend yield.  We 
assume that the rate of return on the stock, ( ) 11 1 ++ + tt SS δ / t , is identically and 
independently distributed over time. 
Stock trades incur proportional transactions costs charged to the bond 
account as follows.  At each date t, the trader pays ( ) 1 t kS +  out of the bond 
account to purchase one ex dividend share of stock and is credited ( in the 
bond account to sell (or, sell short) one ex dividend share of stock.  We assume that 
the transactions cost rate satisfies the restriction 01 . 
) 1 t kS −
k ≤ <
A trader enters the market at date t with dollar holdings  t x  in the bond 
account and   ex dividend shares of stock.  The endowments are stated net of 
any dividend payable on the stock at time t.
/ t yS t
t
18  The trader increases (or, decreases) 
the dollar holdings in the stock account from  to  t y ' tt yy υ = +  by decreasing (or, 
increasing) the bond account from   to  t x ' tt t t xx k | | υ υ = −− .  The decision 
variable  t υ is constrained to be measurable with respect to the information at date 
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t
17 The calendar length of the trading horizon is N years and the calendar length between trading 
dates is   years.  Later on we vary   and consider the mispricing of options under different 
assumptions regarding the calendar length between trading dates. 
/' NT ' T
18 We elaborate on the precise sequence of events.  The trader enters the market at date t with 
dollar holdings  tt x y δ − in the bond account and   cum dividend shares of stock.  Then the 
stock pays cash dividend 
/ tt yS
tt y δ and the dollar holdings in the bond account become  t x .  Thus, the 
trader has dollar holdings  t x in the bond account and   ex dividend shares of stock.  / tt yS
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At the terminal date, the stock account is liquidated,  ' ' υ = −
' |
, and the net 
worth is  .  At each date t, the trader chooses investment  '' | TT T xyk y +− t υ  to 
maximize the expected utility of net worth,  () '' ' || | TT T t Eux y ky S ⎡ ⎤ +− ⎣ ⎦.
19  W e  
make the plausible assumption that the utility function,  () u ⋅ , is increasing and 
concave, and is defined for both positive and negative terminal net worth.
20  Note 
that even this weak assumption of monotonicity and concavity of preferences is not 
imposed on all agents in the economy but only on the subset of agents that we refer 
to as traders. 
We recursively define the value function  () ( ) ≡ ,, tt Vt Vxyt as 
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for   and  '1 tT ≤−
 
() ( ) '' ' ' ' ,, ' | | TT T T T Vx y T ux y ky = +− .     (A.4) 
                                                 
19 The results extend routinely to the case that consumption occurs at each trading date and 
utility is defined over consumption at each of the trading dates and over the net worth at the 
terminal date.  See Constantinides (1979) for details.  The model with utility defined over 
terminal net worth alone is a more realistic representation of the objective function of financial 
institutions. 
20 If utility is defined only for non-negative net worth, then the decision variable is constrained to 
be a member of a convex set that ensures the non-negativity of net worth.  See, Constantinides 
(1979) for details.  However, the derivation of bounds on the prices of derivatives requires an 
entirely different approach and yields weaker bounds.  This problem is studied in Constantinides 
and Zariphopoulou (1999, 2001). 
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We assume that the parameters satisfy appropriate technical conditions such that 
the value function exists and is once differentiable. 
Equations (A.1)-(A.4) define a dynamic program that can be numerically 
solved for given utility function and stock return distribution.  We shall not solve 
this dynamic program because our goal is to derive restrictions on the prices of 
options that are independent of the specific functional form of the utility function 
but solely depend on the plausible assumption that the traders’ utility function is 
monotone increasing and concave in the terminal wealth. 
The value function is increasing and concave in ( ) , tt xy, properties that it 
inherits from the assumed monotonicity and concavity of the utility function, as 
proven in Constantinides (1979): 
 
() ( ) >> 0, 0 xy Vt Vt ,  = 0,..., ,..., ' tT T .   (A.5) 
and 
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On each date, the trader may transfer funds between the bond and stock 
accounts and incur transactions costs.  Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution 
between the bond and stock accounts differs from unity by, at most, the 
transactions cost rate: 
 
() () () ( ) () −≤ ≤ + = 1 1 , 0,..., ,..., ' xy x kV t V t kV t t T T.   (A.7) 
 
Marginal analysis on the bond holdings leads to the following condition on the 
marginal rate of substitution between the bond holdings at dates t and t+1: 
 
() () [] 1 , 0,..., ,..., ' 1 xt x Vt R E Vt t T T =+ = − .   (A.8) 
 
  31Finally, marginal analysis on the stock holdings leads to the following condition on 
the marginal rate of substitution between the stock holdings at date t and the bond 













=+ + + ⎢
⎢ ⎣⎦
0,..., ,..., ' 1 tT T = − ,  . (A.9) 
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We allow for three trading dates,  0,1,2 t = , at the beginning, middle and end of the 
month.  We define the stock returns over the first sub-period as 
() δ ≡+ 1 1 i zS 1 0 / i S , corresponding to the  = , 1,..., Ii I  states on date one.  We 
assume that the returns over the two sub-periods are independent.  Thus, the stock 
returns over the second sub-period,  ( ) δ ≡ += 22 1 1 / , 1,..., ki k i zS S k I , are 
independent of i.  There are   
2, I = = 1,..., , 1,..., iI kI , states on date two. 
We define the state-dependent marginal utility of wealth out of the bond 
account on each one of the three trading dates as  ( ) ( ) 00
B





( ) ( ) 2
B
ik x MV ≡ 2 .  Likewise, we define the state-dependent marginal utility of 
wealth out of the stock account on each of the three trading dates as 
( ) ( ) 00
S
y MV ≡ ,  ( ) ( ) 1
S
iy MV ≡ 1  and  ( ) ( ) 2
S
ik y MV ≡ 2
I
I
.  The conditions on positivity 
and monotonicity of the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond and stock 
accounts at   are given by equations (2.1)-(2.4).  The corresponding 




( ) 2 0, , 1,...,
B
ik Mi k >=      (B.1) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 2 2 ... 2 ... 2 0, 1,...,
SS S S
i i ik iI MM M M i ≥≥ ≥ >=. (B.2) 
 
On each date, the trader may transfer funds between the bond and stock 
accounts and incur transactions costs.  Conditions (2.5) and (2.6) hold.  The 
corresponding condition at   is:  = 2 t
 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + = 1 2 2 1 2 , , 1,...,
BS B
ik ik ik kM M kM i k I . (B.3) 
 
Conditions (2.7) and (2.8) on the marginal rate of substitution between 
dates zero and one hold.  The corresponding conditions between dates one and two 
are as follows: 
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() ()
1







= ∑ I =
I =
J
     (B.4) 
and 
() () () [] 22
1
1 2 2 , 1,...,
I
SS B
ik k i k k i k
k
Mz M z M i πδ
=
=+ ∑ .   (B.5) 
 
We consider J European call and put options on the index, with random 
cash payoff   at  in state ik .  Condition (2.9) is replaced by:  ikj X = 2 t
 
() () () () ()
11
0 2 0 , 1,...,
II
BB B
j j i k ik ikj j j
ik
Pk M M X Pk M j ππ
==
−≤ ≤ += ∑∑ . (B.6) 
 
The probability of state   is   because, by assumption, the stock returns are 
independent over the two sub-periods. 
ik ik ππ
Conditions (2.1)-(2.8) and (B.1)-(B.6) jointly define a linear program.  In our 
empirical analysis, we report the percentage of months in which the linear program 
is feasible and, therefore, stochastic dominance is ruled out. 
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1. Berkeley Options Database 
 
The Berkeley Options Database contains all minute-by-minute quotes and trades of 
the European options and futures on the S&P 500 index from April 2, 1986 to 
December 29, 1995.  Details on this database are found in Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein (1996), Jackwerth (2000) and below. 
Index Level.  Traders typically use the index futures market rather than the 
cash market to hedge their option positions.  The reason is that the cash market 
prices lag futures prices by a few minutes due to lags in reporting transactions of 
the constituent stocks in the index.  We check this claim by regressing the index on 
each of the first twenty minute lags of the futures price.  The single regression with 
the highest adjusted R
2 is assumed to indicate the lag for a given day.  The median 
lag of the index over the 1542 days from 1986 to 1992 is seven minutes.  Because 
the index is stale, we compute a futures-based index for each minute from the 
futures market as  , where F is the futures price at the option 
expiration.  For each day, we use the median interest rate R implied by all futures 
quotes and trades and the index level at that time.  We approximate the dividend 
yield δ by assuming that the dividend amount and timing expected by the market 
were identical to the dividends actually paid on the S&P 500 index.  However, some 
limited tests indicate that the choice of the index does not seem to affect the results 
of this paper. 
()
1
0 1 SR δ
− =+ F
Interest Rate.  We compute implied interest rates embedded in the 
European put-call parity relation.  Armed with option quotes, we calculate separate 
lending and borrowing interest returns from put-call parity where we use the above 
future-based index.  For each expiration date, we assign a single lending and 
borrowing rate to each day, which is the median of all daily observations across all 
strike prices.  We then use the average of these two interest rates as our daily spot 
rate for the particular time to expiration.  Finally, we obtain the interpolated 
interest rates from the implied forward curve.  If there is data missing, we assume 
  35that the spot rate curve can be extrapolated horizontally for the shorter and longer 
times-to-expiration.  Again, some limited tests indicate that the results are not 
affected by the exact choice of the interest rate. 
Option Prices.  We use only bid and ask prices on call options.  For each 
day retained in the sample, we aggregate the quotes to the minute and pick the 
minute between 9:00-11:00 AM with the most quotes as our cross section for the 
month. 
We use only call options with 30 days to expiration which occur once every 
month during our sample.  We also trim the sample to allow for moneyness levels 
between 0.90 and 1.05.  Cross sections with fewer than 5 option quotes are 
discarded.  We also eliminate the cross sections right after the crash of 1987 as the 
data is noisy and restart the sample with the cross section expiring on July 15, 
1988. 
Arbitrage Violations.  In the process of setting up the database, we check for 
a number of errors which might have been contained in the original minute-by-
minute transaction level data.  We eliminate a few obvious data-entry errors as well 
as a few quotes with excessive spreads—more than 200 cents for options and 20 
cents for futures.  General arbitrage violations are eliminated from the data set.  
We also check for violations of vertical and butterfly spreads.  Within each minute, 
we keep the largest set of option quotes which satisfies the restriction 
.  (1 ) max[0, (1 ) ] ii SC S δδ + ≥≥ + −K R
Early exercise is not an issue as the S&P 500 options are European and the 
discreteness of quotes and trades only introduces a stronger upward bias in the 
midpoint implied volatilities for deep-out-of-the-money puts (moneyness less than 
0.6) which we do not use in our empirical work.  We start out with 107 raw cross 
sections and are left with 98 final cross sections. 
 
2. Option Metrics Database 
 
The Option Metrics Database contains indicative end-of-day European call and put 
option quotes on the S&P 500 index from January 2, 1997 to December 31, 2002.  
In merging the Option Metrics Database with the Berkeley Options Database, we 
  36follow the above procedure as much as possible, given the closing prices data that 
the Option Metrics Database provides.  Therefore, only departures and innovations 
from the above procedure are noted. 
Index Level.  As the closing (noon) index price, we use the price implied by 
the closing (noon) futures price. 
Interest Rate.  As we cannot arrive at consistently positive interest rates 
implied by option prices, we use T-bill rates instead, obtained from Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Economic Research Database (FRED
®). 
Option Prices.  In the final sample, only call and put options with at least 
100 traded contracts are included.  We calculate a hypothetical noon option cross 
section from the closing cross section and the index observed at noon and the close.  
Here we assume that the implied volatilities do not change between noon and the 
close.  We start out with 69 raw cross sections and are left with 68 final cross 
sections. The time to expiration is 29 days. 
 
3. S&P 500 Information Bulletin 
 
We obtain the historical daily record of the S&P 500 index and its daily dividend 
record over the period 1928-2002 from the S&P 500 Information Bulletin.  Before 
April 1982, dividends are estimated from monthly dividend yields. 
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The  GARCH (1,1) special case of the Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991) 
semiparametric model applied to the monthly S&P 500 index return,  t y , is 
described by equations (D.1)-(D.3): 
 




1/2 .. . 0 ,1 t hi i d g       (D.2) 
and 
ωα ε β − − =+ +
2
1 tt h 1 t h
)
,     (D.3) 
 
where  is an unknown distribution with zero mean and unit variance.  ( 0,1 g
The parameters ( ) ω αβ , ,  are estimated by maximum likelihood under the 
(false) assumption that  ( )
1/2 .. . 0 ,1 t hi i d N ε
− ∼ .  Then the time series { } ε
−1/2
tt h  is 
calculated and the true density  ( ) 0,1 g  is estimated as the histogram of all the time 
series observations.  The histogram may be smoothed by kernel methods but we do 
not undertake this step in order to keep the procedure comparable to that followed 
in estimating the unconditional distribution. 
One may consider re-estimating the parameters ( ) ,, ω αβ  by maximum 
likelihood, replacing the assumption that  ( )
1/2 .. . 0 ,1 t hi i d N ε
− ∼  with the assumption 
that  , where   is the estimated density in the last step 
above.  Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991) showed by simulation that this 
additional step is unnecessary in practice. 
 (
1/2 .. . 0 ,1 t hi i d g ε
− ∼ ) )  ( 0,1 g
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  41Table 1.  Percentage of Months without Stochastic Dominance Violations in the 
      Single-Period Case 
 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross section of option prices.  In brackets, the table displays the bootstrap standard errors of 
these percentages.  The one-way transactions cost rate (one-way trading fees plus half the bid-ask 
spread) on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transactions cost on each option is proportional to the 
index price, as explained in Section 3.2.  In the second (or, third) row of each cell, the table displays 
the percentage of months without violations when the one-way proportional transactions costs on 
each option are equal to 5 (or, 50) bps of the index price. 
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  42Table 2.  Percentage of Months without Stochastic Dominance Violations in the 
      Single-Period Case—ITM and OTM Calls Separately 
 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross section of in-the-money calls (top entry) and out-of-the-money calls (bottom entry).  The 
one-way transactions cost rate (one-way trading fees plus half the bid-ask spread) on the index is 50 
bps.  The one-way transactions costs on each option are proportional to the index price, as explained 
in Section 3.2. 
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  43Table 3.  Percentage of Months without Stochastic Dominance Violations in the 
      Single-Period Case and Fixed Transactions Costs 
 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross section of option prices.  The one-way transactions costs rate (one-way trading fees plus 
half the bid-ask spread) on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transactions costs on each option are 
20 bps of the index price. 
 


















Number  of  Months    15 29 28 26 35 33 





86 86 31 66 48 





83 89 42 43 30 
Forward-Looking Index 
Sample (including the 
crash) 1987-2002 
60 79 89 50 40 33 
Forward-Looking Index 
Sample (excluding the 
crash) 1988-2002 
67 72 89 46 40 30 
Index Sample 1972-2002 
with Conditional Index 
Return Distribution 
47 93 96  100  43 64 
  44Table 4. Percentage of Months without Stochastic Dominance Violations in the 
      2-Period Case 
 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross section of option prices when one intermediate trading date is allowed over the life of the 
one-month options.  The one-way transactions costs rate (one-way trading fees plus half the bid-ask 
spread) on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transactions costs on each option are proportional to 
the index price, as explained in Section 3.2.  In parentheses, the table displays the percentage of 
months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in the case where no intermediate 
trading is allowed over the life of the one-month options.  Two periods of 15 days and a kernel 
density of 15-day returns is used (discretized to 21 values from e
-0.20 to e
0.20, spaced 0.02 apart in log 
spacing). 
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  45Figure 1.  Bound Violations Based on the Historical Index Sample 1928-1986 
The six panels display the upper and lower option bounds (implied volatilities) calculated with the 
index return distribution based on the historical index sample 1928-1986, as a function of the 
moneyness (K/S).  The figures also display the observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) option implied 
volatilities over the pre-crash period (panel A) and the five post-crash periods (panels B-F).  The 





































































































































































  46Figure 2.  Bound Violations Based on the Historical Index Sample 1972-1986 
The six panels display the upper and lower option bounds (implied volatilities) calculated with the 
index return distribution based on the historical index sample 1972-1986, as a function of the 
moneyness (K/S).  The figures also display the observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) option implied 
volatilities over the pre-crash period (panel A) and the five post-crash periods (panels B-F).  The 






































































































































































  47Figure 3.  Bound Violations Based on the Forward-Looking Index Sample 1987-
2002 
The six panels display the upper and lower option bounds (implied volatilities) calculated with the 
index return distribution based on the forward-looking index sample 1987-2002, as a function of the 
moneyness (K/S).  The figures also display the observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) option implied 
volatilities over the pre-crash period (panel A) and the five post-crash periods (panels B-F).  The 







































































































































































  48Figure 4.  Bound Violations Based on the Forward-Looking Index Sample 1988-
2002 
The six panels display the upper and lower option bounds (implied volatilities) calculated with the 
index return distribution based on the forward-looking index sample 1988-2002, as a function of the 
moneyness (K/S).  The figures also display the observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) option implied 
volatilities over the pre-crash period (panel A) and the five post-crash periods (panels B-F).  The 
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